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NOTES
STATE "COPYRIGHT" PROTECTION
FOR PERFORMERS: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT QUESTION
In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,' the Supreme
Court held that a television station does not enjoy any first amendment
privilege to report in its entirety a "human cannonball" act recognized
as professional property under state law. The decision is an important
step in the developing law governing the conflict between the media's
right to report "newsworthy" information and the right of entertainers
to protect their public performances from unauthorized media dissemi-
nation.
The case involved a "human cannonball" act in which Hugo
Zacchini, the human cannonball, was shot from a cannon into a net 200
feet away. While Zacchini was performing his act at an Ohio county
fair, a television news reporter videotaped the act over Zacchini's ex-
press objection. The film of Zacchini's entire fifteen-second perform-
ance, accompanied by favorable commentary,' was broadcast that
evening in a segment of a regularly scheduled Cleveland news pro-
gram. Zacchini sued the television station for misappropriation of his
professional property.
Recognizing that Ohio law gave Zacchini an enforceable property
interest in his act in the form of a "right of publicity,"3 the Ohio
THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT (1978) [hereinafter cited as M. NIMMER];
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. Rav. 983 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Goldstein].
1. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
2. The following script was read by the news reporter while Zacchini's filmed act was
shown:
This ... now... is the story of a true spectator sport... the sport of human can-
nonballing ... in fact, the great Zacehini is about the only human cannonball around,
these days . .. just happens that, where he is, is the Great Geauga County Fair, in
Burton... and believe me, although it's not a long act, it's a thriller... and you really
need to see it inperson ... to appreciate it....
433 U.S. at 564 n.1 (emphasis in original).
3. See note 65 infra and text accompanying notes 65-80 infra.
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Supreme Court found that Zacchini was entitled to "exclusive control
over the publicity given to his performances." 4 Nevertheless, the Ohio
court held that the television station's infringement of Zacchini's right
of publicity was constitutionally privileged. Relying in part on the
Supreme Court's decision in Time, Inc. v. Hill,5 the court held that the
television station's broadcast was not actionable because it involved a
report of a newsworthy event of legitimate public interest.6 In articu-
lating the nature of the concept of "newsworthiness," the court stated:
The proper standard must necessarily be whether the matters re-
ported were of public interest, and if so, the press will be liable for
appropriation of a performer's right of publicity only if its actual in-
tent was not to report the performance, but, rather, to appropriate the
performance for some other private use, or if the actual intent was to
injure the performer.7
After granting certiorari on the ground that the state court's recog-
nition of a news privilege might have been "compelled" by a misinter-
pretation of its first amendment cases, the Supreme Court reversed in a
5-4 decision.' The Court's opinion, written by Justice White, goes to
great lengths to distinguish the Zacchini case from the long line of
Supreme Court decisions that imposed first amendment limitations on
state law actions for defamation and invasion of privacy. In making
this distinction, the Court in essence held that the first amendment per-
mits, under the rubric of newsworthiness, a greater intrusion into indi-
vidual rights in reputation and privacy than into individual rights in
intellectual property. This Note will explore this double standard and
will argue that, while the scope of the media's right to disseminate
newsworthy performances should not be coextensive with the privileges
enjoyed under the defamation and privacy cases, the first amendment
requires a limited media privilege to disseminate newsworthy reports
involving a performer's act. It will be argued further that the Court's
reliance on the fact that Zacchini's entire act was broadcast produced a
standard that is, even within the bounds of intellectual property law, a
mechanical and poorly conceived legal test.
4. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 232, 351 N.E.2d 454,
460 (1976).
5. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
6. 47 Ohio St. 2d at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 461.
7. Id.
8. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). Justice Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan
and Marshall joined. In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the Ohio
court's grounds of decision were sufficiently ambiguous to require remand to determine whether
the decision rested on independent and adequate state grounds. Id. at 582-83. See generally
Note, Supreme Court Treatment of State Court Cases Exhibiting Ambiguous Grounds of Decision,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 822 (1962).
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I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY VS. REPUTATION AND PRIVACY: THE
COURT'S DICHOTOMY
At the threshold of the Court's analysis in Zacchini there is a cru-
cial effort to distinguish the first amendment considerations in intellec-
tual property law from the first amendment limitations on the law of
defamation and invasion of privacy. Characterizing the Ohio
Supreme Court's opinion as relying "heavily" on Hill,9 the Court stated
that the right of privacy at stake in Hill was analytically distinct from
the publicity right afforded by Ohio to Hugo Zacchini. The Court in
Hill, Justice White asserted, was aware that it was adjudicating a false-
light privacy case and not the "discrete kind of 'appropriation' case"10
at issue in Zacchini. Therefore, he reasoned, the Hill standard was
inapplicable to Zacchini because
[t]he Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring [the tele-
vision station] to compensate [Zacchini] for broadcasting his act on
television than it would privilege [the television station] to film and
broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work without liability to the copy-
right owner, . . . or to film and broadcast a prize fight, ... or a
baseball game ... "I'
The celebrated line of defamation cases emanating from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan 2 --Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 3 Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 4 and Time, Inc. v. Firestone 5-were similarly
treated as a distinct and essentially unrelated line of precedent: "These
cases. . . emphasize the protection extended to the press by the First
Amendment in defamation cases, particularly when suit is brought by a
public official or a public figure. None of them involve an alleged ap-
propriation by the press of a right of publicity existing under state
law."
16
It is this crucial distinction between the line of precedent arising
from New York Times and Hill and the precedent associated with intel-
lectual property cases that provided the Court with an analytical basis
for its reversal of the Ohio court's decision. If Zacchini had been de-
9. 433 U.S. at 566-67, 570.
10. Id. at 571-72. The Court found it "abundantly clear that Time, Inc. v. Hill did not in-
volve a performer, a person with a name having commercial value, or any claim to a 'right of
publicity.'" Id. at 572.
11. Id. at 575.
12. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See notes 20-23 infra and accompanying text.
13. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). See notes 34-37 infra and accompanying text.
14. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See notes 41-49 infra and accompanying text.
15. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). See notes 50-57 infra and accompanying text.
16. 433 U.S. at 574.
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famed by the television station he might have been denied relief under
the New York Times standard.1 7 Had he sued for a false-light invasion
of privacy the television station would have escaped liability under the
Hill standard. 8 Nevertheless, because he claimed injury not to his
reputation or sensibilities but only to his pocketbook, Zacchini pre-
vailed in the Supreme Court. To explore the wisdom of this dual con-
stitutional standard it is necessary to review the history of the concept
of "newsworthiness," first as it has fared under the defamation/privacy
line of cases and then as a component of intellectual property law.
A. Newsworthiness and the Defamation/Privacy Cases.
The concept of newsworthiness has been an integral part of the
evolution of constitutional limitations on the common law of defama-
tion and privacy. This subsection of the Note will trace the evolution
of the newsworthiness doctrine in defamation and privacy law from its
inception in New York to its culmination in Rosenbloom. It will be
shown that the development of the newsworthiness analysis-which fo-
cused the first amendment inquiry on the nature and subject matter of
a publication-provided courts with a doctrinally and pragmatically
sound method of distinguishing protected from unprotected speech.
The Court's subsequent retreat from Rosenbloom in Gertz and
Firestone will then be critically examined. It will be suggested that,
rather than eliminating the newsworthiness concept as a first amend-
ment doctrine in defamation law, the Gertz and Firestone decisions
merely altered the definition of the term "newsworthiness."
1. Evolution: from New York Times to Rosenbloom. Until
1964, libelous speech was thought to be outside the purview of first
17. In Gertz the Court stated that certain persons who would otherwise be designated private
figures may still be deemed public figures "for a limited range of issues." 418 U.S. at 351. Some
persons, however, because of their fame or notoriety are public figures "for all purposes and in all
contexts." Id. In either case "[t]he New York Times standard defines the level of constitutional
protection appropriate to the context of defamation...." d. at 342. Consequently, a public
figure may recover for defamation "only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory false-
hood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth." Id.
Had the television station accompanied its filmed report with false allegations that the human
cannonball act was merely an optical illusion, deliberately designed to defraud and'mislead the
paying public, the damage to Zacchini's professional reputation might have caused a significant
decrease in the economic value of his act as well as psychic harm. Nevertheless, in an action for
defamation he would have been denied recovery absent proof of knowing or reckless falsity.
18. In Hill the Court stated that "[t]he guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of
political expression or comment upon public affairs ...... 385 U.S. at 388. Thus, it held, a
person seeking to recover damages for a false-light invasion of privacy is subject to the New York
Times burden of proof if the matter reported was of "public interest." Id. at 387-88. See text
accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
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amendment protection. 9 Then, in New York Times, a unanimous
Court held that libelous speech concerning the official conduct of pub-
lic officials is privileged by the first amendment unless the libel consti-
tutes a knowing or reckless falsehood." This protection of some
admittedly false speech was required by the first amendment, the Court
reasoned, to ensure the free discussion of public issues essential to the
proper functioning of an enlightened democracy.21 In adopting as a
constitutional principle the Madisonian view that "[t]he right of free
public discussion of the stewardship of public officials. . .[is] a funda-
mental principle of the American form of government, '22  the New
York Times Court effectively elevated the public interest in matters rel-
evant to self-government to a position of central importance in first
amendment theory.23
19. At common law a defamation plaintiff-whether private citizen or government offi-
cial-was entitled to recover damages unless the defendant could prove that the speech was either
truthful or protected by one of a limited number of common law privileges. Damages were pre-
sumed in certain cases, and the publisher's motives generally were not examined. Absent proofof
truth or privilege, defendants were held strictly liable, regardless of the subject matter of the
libelous speech. "This [restriction on speech] was assumed to be of no first amendment concern,
because the Court had said repeatedly in dicta that libelous words were not protected by the
Constitution." Anderson, Libel and Press Seff-Censorsho, 53 TEXAs L. REv. 422, 422-23 (1975);
see Note, Defamation, Privacy andthe First Amendment, 1976 DUKE L.J. 1016, 1020-21.
20. The plaintiff was an elected official of the city of Montgomery, Alabama, who had won a
jury verdict in state court after claiming that he had been libeled by certain statements appearing
in a political advertisement in the New York Times. The text of the advertisement had alleged,
inter alia, that the Montgomery police had violated the civil rights of black students. While
conceding that certain of the statements contained in the advertisement were erroneous, 376 U.S.
at 258, the Court held that
[tihe constitutional guarantees [of free speech] require ... a federal rule that pro-
hibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not.
Id. at 279-80.
21. A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual
assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads
to. . . "self-censorship." Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving
it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will be deterred .... Under
such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact true, because of
doubt whether it can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They
tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful zone." The rule
thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.
Id. at 279 (citation omitted).
22. Id. at 275.
23. In an article exploring the historical and philosophical bases for the New York Times
decision, Justice Brennan described the case as one that "presented a classic example of an activity
that Dr. Meiklejohn called an activity of'governing importance' within the powers reserved to the
people and made invulnerable to sanctions imposed by their agency-governments." Brennan, The
Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of/he First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1, 14
(1965)., Because the case involved an activity of "governing importance"-the criticism of the
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For a time it remained uncertain whether the New York Times
privilege was to be broadly applied or confined to the narrow class of
cases that involved political or seditious libel.24 One commentator
who quickly perceived the potential breadth of the principle underlying
the New York Times decision observed with some prescience that "the
invitation [for the Court] to follow a dialectic progression from public
official to government policy to public policy to matters in the public
domain, like art, seems . . . to be overwhelming. '25  Within three
years of the decision the Court, in Hill, indicated that it would indeed
accept the "invitation" so to expand its new first amendment doctrine.
The Hill case was a statutory right of privacy action involving the
publication of nondefamatory falsehoods concerning private individu-
als.26  The false statements had appeared in a Life magazine report on
the opening of a new play that had been inspired, in part, by an ordeal
suffered by the Hill family. Sustaining the publisher's claim of a first
amendment privilege, the Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment permitted recovery for nondefamatory falsehoods concerning
matters of public or general concern only upon proof of knowing or
reckless falsity. The New York Times privilege applied equally to a
report of the opening of a play, the Court explained, because "[t]he
guarantees for speech and press are not the [exclusive] preserve of po-
litical expression or comment upon public affairs ... ."27 Thus, at
least within the context of the right of privacy, the Court effectively
enlarged the perimeters of constitutionally protected speech to include
reports of all newsworthy matters.28
official conduct of a government official-the Court, Justice Brennan explained, relied on none of
the tests traditionally applied in determining the validity of attempts by the government to regu-
late speech. "Instead, the Court examined history to discern the central meaning of the first
amendment, and concluded that that meaning was revealed in Madison's statement 'that the cen-
sorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.'"
Id. at 15 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794)).
24. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 23, at 19; Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning ofthe First Amendment," 1964 SUPREME COURT REv. 191, 221.
25. Kalven, supra note 24, at 221.
26. Dean Prosser identified four distinct torts, each of which is actionable as an invasion of
the right of privacy. The "false-light" branch of the tort recognizes that a person's sensibilities
may be injured by nondefamatory falsehoods that place him in a "false light in the public eye."
Although reputational injury need not be shown, the falsehoods generally must be of a kind that
the average, reasonable person in similar circumstances would find objectionable. W. PROSSER,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 812-14 (4th ed. 1971). The Zacchini Court adopted Dean Prosser's
terminology in characterizing Hill as a false-light case. 433 U.S. at 571.
27. 385 U.S. at 388.
28. See Kalven, The Reasonable Man andthe FirstAmendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967
SUPREME COURT REv. 267, 282-83. Professor Kalven characterized New York Times as a "silent
partner" in the Hill decision:
What it did was to illuminate for the Court the possibilities of censorship, by individual
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The Court did not immediately adopt-the Hill newsworthiness ra-
tionale as an express constitutional limitation on nonpolitical libel; in-
stead, the doctrine was incorporated in a series of cases. Having
established in New York Times that public discussion of the official
conduct of public officials is privileged, the Court went on in Curtis
Publishing Company v. Butts29 to articulate a similar privilege for the
defamation of persons classified as "public figures."30
The Butts decision did not expressly invoke the Hill rationale;
rather, its extension of the applicability of the New York Times privi-
lege was premised on the public's interest in the conduct of nonofficial
persons who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important
public questions" or famous enough to "shape events in areas of con-
cern to society at large."' 31  Nonetheless, the influence of the Hill news-
worthiness principle can be perceived in the broad definition of "public
figure" subscribed to by five members of the Court.32  Rejecting the
view that public figure status should be predicated solely upon an indi-
vidual's voluntary involvement in public matters prior to and in-
dependent of the event giving rise to the libel,33 the majority adopted a
definition that encompassed previously anonymous persons involunta-
rily in the public eye because of current involvement in matters of pub-
lic interest. It is clear, therefore, that a majority of the Court in the
public figure libel cases viewed the newsworthiness of the subject mat-
ter of a libel as the line of demarcation dividing protected from unpro-
tected speech.
The newsworthiness rationale implicit in the Butts definition of
libel actions, of criticism of government operation and policy. It thus set the perspective
the Court took toward the events in Hill. The individual tort action, albeit in privacy,
carries a comparable threat of censorship over valued, albeit less urgently valued, public
speech. Thus although Hill with its mild entertainment news value was on its face
worlds removed from New York Times on its grim facts about Negro protests, the two
cases were seen to fall within a common sphere-speech affecting individuals that is of
public interest.
Id. 283.
29. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The Butts case was reported together with Associated Press v.
Walker.
30. Butts was the athletic director at the University of Georgia. In an article published in the
Saturday Evening Post Butts was falsely accused of fixing a football game by revealing informa-
tion about the Georgia team's plays to the coach of the opposing team. The Supreme Court
upheld Butts' libeljudgment. 388 U.S. at 161. Walker, the respondent in the companion case,
see note 29 supra, was a retired army general. An Associated Press report had falsely accused him
of leading a violent demonstration aimed at preventing the enrollment of a black student at the
University of Mississippi. The Court reversed Walker's libel judgment Id. at 161-62.
31. Id. at 163-64 (Warren, Ci., concurring).
32. Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas and Marshall and Chief Justice Warren concurred in
the definition.
33. This narrower definition of "public figure" was subscribed to by Justices Harlan, Clark,
Fortas and Stewart. 388 U.S. at 154-55 (opinion of Harlan, J.).
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public figures eventually was made the explicit basis for the extension
of the New York Times standard to private defamation plaintiffs in Ro-
senbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.34 Justice Brennan, speaking for a plu-
rality of the Court, reasoned that the public interest-the same
principle that had compelled the New York Times decision-required
the abandonment of the public figure/private figure distinction in li-
bel.35 Instead, he argued, the constitutional inquiry should focus on
the nature of the subject matter giving rise to the defamation. This
change of focus was mandated by the first amendment because "[tihe
public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the con-
duct of the participant and the content, effect, and significance of the
conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety. '36  For
this reason, the plurality held, the New York Times privilege applied as
well to defamatory speech concerning private individuals, provided the
subject matter of the libel was of public or general concern.37
The Rosenbloom plurality recognized that "[i]f a matter is a sub-
ject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less so
merely because a private individual is involved. ... 38 The recogni-
tion of this fact, and the extension of the New York Times privilege to
private figures, can be viewed as logically necessary steps in the evolu-
tion of a first amendment doctrine premised from its inception on the
value of promoting public debate on a wide range of issues.39 In New
York Times, the Court held for the first time that the public interest in
matters pertaining to self-government mandates constitutional protec-
tion for speech constituting political and seditious libel. In Butts, the
Court reasoned that a constitutional distinction between public officials
and public figures had "no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment
policy" if adequate protection were to be given to "the rights of the
press and public to inform and be informed on matters of legitimate
34. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom, a magazine distributor, had been arrested for selling
allegedly obscene material. After his inventory of nudist magazines was seized by the police
Rosenbloom sought injunctive relief. A local broadcaster reporting on the injunctive action char-
acterized the confiscated magazines as "obscene" and implied that Rosenbloom was a peddler of
"girlie-books." Id. at 32-35.
35. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Brennan's opinion. Justice
Black concurred in the result on the ground that the press should be absolutely immune to liability
for defamation, id. at 57, and Justice White concurred on the narrower ground that the press
should be privileged to report the official conduct of public servants. Id. at 62. Justice Douglas
did not participate in the decision.
36. Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See Anderson, supra note 19, at 445-46. Professor Anderson points out that this logical
basis for the New York Times privilege was recognized by the many lower courts that applied the
standard to private plaintiffs prior to the Rosenbloom decision. Id. 446 & n.113.
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interest."4 Finally, the privilege was extended in Rosenbloom to pro-
tect, on first amendment public interest grounds, the public discussion
of any newsworthy matter, without regard to the fame or anonymity of
the person defamed. Thus, what began in New York Times as a princi-
ple applicable to a narrowly circumscribed area of speech-public dis-
cussion of matters relating to the people's self-governing
powers-evolved into a doctrine broad enough to protect the discus-
sion of any matter of public or general interest.
2. Redfining theprinciole: Gertz and Firestone. In Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc.,4 1 the Court re-examined the doctrinal development
that had culminated three years earlier in Rosenbloom. Then, without
expressly overruling its earlier decision, five members of the Court dis-
avowed the Rosenbloom newsworthiness rationale by holding that the
defamation of private persons is not entitled to the New York Times
immunity regardless of the newsworthiness of the published matter.
The Gertz Court's uneasiness with the Rosenbloom plurality's
newsworthiness rule was rooted in two concerns. First, the Court
feared that adherence to the Rosenbloom standard would leave private
citizens unduly vulnerable to libel whenever they were involved in
events that were of interest to the public. In the majority's view, the
requirement that public figures and officials continue to bear the heavy
New York Times burden of proof in libel cases remained justified be-
cause, having greater access to the media, public persons can resort to
extra-judicial "self-help" means of redressing defamatory falsehoods.42
For private persons, however, the sole remedy for the harms of defama-
tion is a judicial one.43 Therefore, the Court reasoned, when a private
person is defamed the state's greater interest in compensating his
40. 388 U.S. at 163-65.
41. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz was a lawyer who represented the family of a man murdered
by a Chicago policeman. The defendant published a magazine article alleging that Gertz was a
"Communist-fronter" who was involved in a conspiracy to discredit the Chicago police. Gertz
sued for libel, winning a jury verdict of fifty thousand dollars. The trial court entered judgment
n.o.v. for the publisher on the ground that the New York Times standard applied to private figures
involved in public issues. Relying on Rosenbloom, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of
the district court. In an opinion written by Justice Powell, in which Justices Stewart, Marshall,
Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, the Court reversed, holding that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability
for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id. at
347 (footnote omitted).
42. The majority reasoned that "[plublic officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic
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reputational injury justifies a narrowing of Rosenbloom's blanket pro-
tection of newsworthy speech.' The second source of the majority's
dissatisfaction with Rosenbloom was its fear that the newsworthiness
standard would require the judiciary to assume an inappropriate edito-
rial role in order to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which publica-
tions concerned matters of "public or general interest."45 Attempting
to mitigate both of these concerns, the Gertz Court changed the focus of
its first amendment inquiry from the newsworthiness of the publication
at issue to the status of the person defamed."
In holding that only public figures47 and public officials must sat-
isfy the New York Times standard, the Gertz Court purported to repu-
diate the newsworthiness privilege as a first amendment doctrine in
defamation cases.48 However, an examination of the Gertz rationale
as it was applied in Firestone reveals that elements of the newsworthi-
ness concept have been retained, although in altered form, as an essen-
tial component of the Court's first amendment analysis.49
The Firestone case involved a Time magazine report concerning
the divorce decree of Mary Alice Firestone, a prominent Palm Beach
socialite. The divorce proceedings had received extensive news cover-
age, °5 some of it at the instigation of Mrs. Firestone, who had held
several press conferences during the trial. The defamatory statement
at issue was an erroneous report that the plaintiff's husband had been
44. Id. The Court found private plaintiffs to be not only more vulnerable to libel but more
deserving of protection as well. In the Court's view, public figures "invite attention and com-
ment." Thus, they "have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defama-
tory falsehood [sic] concerning them." Id. at 345. A private figure, however, "has relinquished
no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name ...." Id. See note 60 infra.
45. 418 U.S. at 346. The majority "doubt[ed] the wisdom of committing this task to the
conscience ofjudges," id., despite Justice Brennan's insistence that the resolution of such constitu-
tional questions was a traditional judicial function. Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46. Thus, the Court held, states could permit a private defamation plaintiff to recover under
any standard except strict liability in cases where the defamatory potential of the publication was
apparent. Id. at 347-48.
47. The Gertz Court's definition of a public figure is quoted in the text accompanying note 52
infra.
48. The Court found that a standard that required courts to privilege the discussion of all
issues of public or general interest resulted in too "thin a line between the drastic alternatives of
the New York Times privilege and the common law of strict liability for defamatory errors." 418
U.S. at 346.
49. See text accompanying notes 52-62 infra. For a thoughtful pre-Firestone analysis of
Gertz's impact on the issue-oriented New York Times doctrine see Brosnahan, From Times v.
Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 777 (1975).
50. "The 17-month trial and related events attracted national news coverage, and elicited no
fewer than 43 articles in the Miami Herald and 45 articles in the Palm Beach Post and Palm Beach
Times." 424 U.S. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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granted the divorce on the ground of adultery."1
To determine whether the New York Times standard applied, the
Court first had to decide whether Mrs. Firestone was a public figure.
The Gertz opinion had posited two bases for such a determination:
In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or
notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all
contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself
or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes
a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such per-
sons assume special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions.52
Applying the first criterion, the Court determined that, despite her
prominence in the Palm Beach community, Mrs. Firestone was neither
famous nor notorious enough to be deemed a public figure for all pur-
poses.5 3  Since there was no question of the extent of Mrs. Firestone's
involvement in the reported event,54 the Court attempted to determine
whether the event itself was a "public question. 55 In making this de-
termination the Court necessarily assumed the task of evaluating the
public's first amendment interest in receiving news of the Firestone di-
vorce. Only after finding that news coverage of the divorce "would
add almost nothing toward advancing the uninhibited debate on public
issues thought to provide principal support for the decision in New
York Times"56 was the Court able to determine that the defendant was
5I. Id. at 450.
52. 418 U.S. at 351.
53. The basis for this finding was that "[r]espondent did not assume any role of especial
prominence in the affairs of society, other than perhaps Palm Beach society .... " 424 U.S. at
453. In Gertz, however, the Court's analysis of the plaintiff's status implied that a person's fame
or notoriety in his community would properly support a finding that he was a public figure. In
that case the Court declined to designate Gertz as a public figure for all purposes because "he had
achieved no general fame or notoriety in the community. None of the prospective jurors called at
the trial had ever heard of [Gertz] prior to [the] litigation, and respondent offered no proof that
this response was atypical of the local population." 418 U.S. at 351-52 (emphasis added). In
Firestone, however, the record showed that the plaintiff had subscribed to a press-clipping service
prior to bringing suit for divorce. This evidenced to Justice Marshall that prior to and independ-
ent of the event giving rise to libel Mrs. Firestone had deliberately sought and achieved sufficient
local prominence to justify the media's acting on the assumption that she was a public figure. 424
U.S. at 486-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Justice Marshall noted in dissent that Mrs. Firestone had held a number of press confer-
ences during the course of the divorce trial. 424 U.S. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting). It was
clear, therefore, that Mrs. Firestone had "engage[d] the public's attention in an attempt to influ-
ence its outcome." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
55. See text accompanying note 52 supra. The Gertz Court, eschewing an issue-oriented
analysis, did not define the term "public question." Rather, the Gertz public figure designation
appears to have been predicated on the assumption that only a plaintiff's conduct would give rise
to limited public figure status.
56. 424 U.S. at 457.
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not entitled to the New York Times privilege. 7
Both the Gertz rationale and the Firestone analysis reveal that the
Court continues to recognize the need in some cases for a first amend-
ment privilege to disseminate reports of newsworthy matters. The sur-
viving news privilege is not, however, coextensive with the privilege
enjoyed by the media under Rosenbloom. Rather, the Court's defini-
tion of "newsworthiness" after Gertz and Firestone is both broader and
narrower than the short-lived Rosenbloom standard. 8 In place of
Rosenbloom's unitary definition, which privileged the publication of all
subject matter of public or general concern regardless of who was de-
famed, the Court has substituted a two-tiered standard that looks to the
newsworthiness of persons as well as events.
The first tier of the Gertz standard subsumes a much broader defi-
nition of newsworthiness than was intended by the Rosenbloom plural-
ity since an initial determination of public figure status for all purposes
now automatically triggers the New York Times standard.5 9  Conse-
quently, the press is privileged to publish false reports of purely private
matters, so long as the publications concern public officials or figures
and are not knowingly or recklessly false. This sweeping privilege ap-
pears to be predicated on the normative notion that public persons,
having once "invite[d] attention and comment '60 by placing themselves
in the public eye, are always newsworthy simply by virtue of their sta-
tus. The second tier of the Gertz standard narrows the definition of
newsworthiness, however. As was demonstrated by the Court's analy-
sis in Firestone, even a person who becomes extensively and publicly
involved in a well publicized event will retain private status unless the
event itself can be characterized as an issue that is of "governing im-
57. In focusing on the nature of the event involved in Firestone the Court thus "resurrect[ed]
the precise difficulties that... Gertz was designed to avoid." Id. at 487 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. The Rosenbloom plurality would have privileged all reports of matters that were found to
be of "public or general concern." This remains the standard for false-light privacy cases under
Hill. See text accompanying notes 26-28 supra.
59. 418 U.S. at 342-43.
60. Id at 345. In a dissenting opinion Justice Brennan pointed to the doctrinal and logical
inconsistency of treating public figures as "newsworthy" in all aspects of their lives:
[Voluntarily or not, we are all "public" men to some degree. Conversely, some aspects
of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of public or
general concern. [Citation omitted.] Thus, the idea that certain "public" figures have
voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private individuals have
kept theirs carefully shrouded from public view is, at best, a legal fiction. In any event,
such a distinction could easily produce the paradoxical result of dampening discussion of
issues of public or general concern because they happen to involve private citizens while
extending constitutional encouragement to discussion of aspects of the lives of "public
figures" that are not in the area of public or general concern.
Id. at 364 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 48).
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portance" to the people.6 Conversely, Gertz demonstrates that private
figure status will nevertheless be enjoyed even when the event in ques-
tion is undeniably a public issue of "governing importance" if the
plaintiff's public involvement in the event is not extensive. 62 Thus, un-
less a defamation plaintiff is a public figure for all purposes, the New
York Times privilege will not apply unless two kinds of newsworthi-
ness are present: the relevant event must be newsworthy because it is a
"public question," and the plaintiff must be newsworthy because of his
extensive and public involvement in the event.
A discussion of the wisdom of the current status of the media's
news privilege in defamation law is beyond the scope of this Note.63
For present purposes, it is sufficient to recognize that despite the ab-
sence of a unitary constitutional standard, the media continue to enjoy
some measure of first amendment immunity to publish newsworthy re-
ports that infringe individuals' interests in their reputations. In addi-
tion, the Hill newsworthiness standard continues to privilege the media
to infringe individuals' privacy interests when disseminating news that
is of public or general concern." Each of these news privileges re-
mains premised on the Court's recognition of the inherent conflict be-
tween the first amendment and state laws that permit individuals to
suppress speech that is injurious to their reputations and sensibilities.
A similar conflict with the first amendment inheres in laws granting
exclusive rights in intellectual property.
B. Newsworthiness and Intellectual Property.
1. The right of publicidy and the public interest. Although the
Supreme Court recognized the common law right of publicity65 for the
61. Meiklejohn's "governing importance" category has been characterized by Justice Bren-
nan as including "the vast range of forms of thought and expression by which the voter might
equip himself to exercise a proper judgment in casting his ballot." Brennan, supra note 23, at 13.
Thus, "[e]ducation in all its phases, the achievements of philosophy and the sciences, literature
and the arts, all fall within the subjects of 'governing importance' that the first amendment abso-
lutely protects from abridgment." Id
62. The libel at issue in Gertz involved statements alleging that the plaintiff, a lawyer repre-
senting persons suing a police officer, was involved in a Communist conspiracy designed to dis-
credit the Chicago police. 418 U.S. at 325-26. Despite the undeniably public nature of the event
in question, the Court found that Gertz had not "thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue,
nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome." Id. at 352.
63. For an excellent criticism of the Court's current approach to defamation law see Christie,
Injury to Reputation and the Constitution: Confusion and ConflictingApproaches, 75 MICH. L. REV.
43 (1976).
64. See Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1974).
65. Misappropriations of individuals' names, likenesses and personalities have been litigated
under various theories, invasion of the right of privacy being the theory most frequently relied
upon. See generally Gordon, .Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55
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first time in Zacchini, its opinion does not employ the traditional right
of publicity analysis, which recognizes a public interest defense.66 One
reason for the Court's novel approach is suggested by its recent defa-
mation decisions: it wished to avoid giving additional constitutional
stature to the newsworthiness doctrine as a limitation on state tort law.
A second reason can be found in the singular facts of the case itself.
Zacchini is one of only a few reported cases to involve the infringement
of an entire performance, and is the only one of these where the in-
fringement occurred during a news broadcast.67
Nw. U.L. REv. 553 (1960); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203
(1954); Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN
L. Rav. 527 (1976). The term "right of publicity" is used in this Note to refer to any case where a
plaintiff has claimed an infringement of his exclusive property right in his name, likeness or as-
pects of his personality, regardless of the theory relied upon by the plaintiff or the court.
The enforceable property interest of a celebrity in the commercial value of his name and
likeness, apart from any privacy right that may be retained, was first expressly identified as the
"right of publicity" by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. In Haelan Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953),
the grantee of exclusive rights to use a ballplayer's name and picture to advertise chewing gum
sued for tortious inducement of breach of contract after the defendant contracted with the same
ballplayer to obtain similar rights. The court agreed with the defendant's contention that, under
existing privacy law, the plaintiffs exclusive-use contract did not constitute an assignment but
merely served to release the plaintiff from potential liability under the New York privacy statute
for unauthorized advertising use of the ballplayer's picture. 202 F.2d at 867. However, the court
found that the ballplayer, like other persons whose names and likenesses are commercially valua-
ble, had an assignable right to the exclusive use of his name and picture that was independent of
New York's statutory right of privacy. 1d. at 868. In defining that right Judge Frank stated:
We think that. . . a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, ie., the
right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may
validly be made "in gross," le., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of
anything else. Whether it is labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for here. . . the
tag "property" simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuni-
ary worth.
This right might be called a "right of publicity."
id. Therefore, the court held that if the defendant had used the ballplayer's photograph with
knowledge of the plaintiffs contract, the use was an actionable appropriation. Id. at 869.
66. See text accompanying notes 70-72, 76-80 infra.
67. Prior to Zacchini media defendants had been held liable in appropriation cases involving
commercial broadcasts of filmed and live athletic events. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broad-
casting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v.
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938). However, the Zacchini case appears to
be the only reported case in which a media defendant, clearly acting in a noncommercial capacity
as a news disseminator, has been sued for appropriation on the basis of an accurate news broad-
cast.
In the two reported cases involving performance appropriation a newsworthiness privilege
was applied. See Man v. Warner Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier v. Pro-
Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). In Man, the plaintiff, a musician attending
the Woodstock Festival, had climbed onto the stage and played "mess call" on his flugelhorn.
His 45-second performance was recorded on film by the defendant and subsequently included in a
commercially distributed documentary feature film depicting the famous rock music festival.
Man sued for appropriation under the New York privacy statute. The district court held that the
statute was not intended to provide a cause of action for the appropriation of a professional enter-
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In the more frequently litigated right of publicity cases a celebrity
typically claims that an unauthorized commercial use has been made of
his name, his photograph or aspects of his personality.68 The state's
sole purpose in providing him with a remedy is to protect the commer-
cial value of these quasi-property interests.6 9  The celebrity's property
rights in his name, likeness and personality are not absolute, however.
Courts traditionally have held, and commentators agree, that "[w]here
use of a person's name, photograph, or likeness is made in the dissemi-
nation of news or in a manner required by the public interest, that per-
son should not be able to complain of the infringement of his right of
publicity."70
The newsworthiness privilege to infringe an individual's right of
publicity necessarily differs from the correlative privilege in defamation
and false-light invasion of privacy cases. Because truthful publications
cannot, by definition, give rise to liability for defamation or false-light
invasions of privacy-regardless of the injurious effect that some truth-
ful speech may have on an individual's reputation or sensibilities-the
constitutional question in defamation and privacy cases concerns only
the extent to which the first amendment mandates protection for false
speech.7 ' In a right of publicity case, however, the plaintiff usually
tainer's public performances; that the film itself, although a commercial undertaking, was a privi-
leged account of a newsworthy event; and that, in any case, an appropriation of a 45-second
performance must be considered de minimus. 317 F. Supp. at 53. In Gautier, a wild-animal
trainer had contracted with the owner of a football team to perform his animal act during the half-
time of a televised football game. Although his contract expressly provided that the act was not
to be televised without the performer's written consent, his entire seven-minute act was included
in the commercially sponsored telecast. On appeal of the statutory right of privacy action the
New York Court of Appeals found that the appropriation had not been for advertising purposes
since the plaintiff "was not connected with the [sponsor's] product either by visual, oral or other
reference... : 304 N.Y. at 359, 107 N.E.2d at 488. The alternative statutory requirement, a
trade purpose, was found to be absent on the ground that the dissemination by the media of
newsworthy events, even if done for a profit, was a well-established press exception to the statute.
304 N.Y. at 360, 107 N.E.2d at 488. Finally, the court ruled that in becoming "an actual partici-
pant in a public event" and "voluntarily occupying the very center of attraction" the plaintiff had
effectively waived his right of privacy. 304 N.Y. at 360, 107 N.E.2d at 489.
68. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (ballplayers'
names and sports statistics used without permission in defendant company's board game);
Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (athlete's picture used to
advertise beer); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d
144 (Sup. Ct.), modoed, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973) (Howard Hughes' name and
biographical data used in defendant's "Howard Hughes Game").
69. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
70. Nimmer, supra note 65, at 216-17. In his seminal article on the right of publicity Profes-
sor Nimmer also stated that "the defense of public interest should be no less effective in a publicity
action than in a privacy action." Id. at 216. See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (Sup. Ct.
1972); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
71. See text accompanying notes 19-64 supra.
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seeks compensation for damages resulting from a truthful publication.
Consequently, courts generally have been willing to limit the right of
publicity on public interest grounds in cases presenting a risk of "chil-
ling" the dissemination of truthful speech.
72
When a public interest defense is asserted in right of publicity
cases, courts traditionally look first to the nature of the appropriation.
It is well established that the unauthorized use of a person's name or
photograph to advertise a product is never privileged.73 Similarly,
even if there has not been an advertising use, a defendant usually will
be liable for a commercial appropriation of an individual's right of
publicity.74 In such cases, the plaintiff's exclusive property right in his
name, likeness or personality has been found to outweigh the slight
public interest that might be served by permitting a commercial in-
fringement.75 In no case, however, has a state court ruled that the
newsworthiness privilege is inapplicable to a noncommercial news in-
fringement.
The right of publicity public interest privilege can be a broad one
that "extends far beyond the dissemination of news in the sense of cur-
rent events and includes. . . even entertainment and amusement, con-
cerning interesting phases of human activity in general. '76  Because of
72. See notes 79-80 infra and text accompanying notes 76-80 infra.
73. See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974);
Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The Grant case involved an unusual
factual situation. In 1946, Cary Grant consented to a magazine publisher's use of his photograph
in connection with an article on men's fashions. In 1971, an issue of the magazine contained an
update of the men's clothing industry. Without obtaining Grant's consent, the publisher used the
head from the actor's 1946 picture superimposed on the body of an unidentified model in modem
attire. The court held that the news privilege would be applicable unless it was determined, upon
further pretrial discovery, that the purported fashion news item was actually a paid advertisement.
Id. at 878.
74. See, e.g., Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Uhlaender
v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems,
Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct. 1973), modfed, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345
N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973).
75. In Palmer v. Schonhom Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1967), the plaintiffs, well-known professional golfers, were granted injunctive relief when
their names and biographical data were used by the defendant in connection with its "Pro-Am
Golf Game." Although the defendant had claimed that its use of names and statistics available
on public records was privileged, the court held that the appropriation was for commercial rather
than for information-dissemination purposes. Id. at 79, 232 A.2d at 462. Similarly, the court in
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.
1973), modofed, 42 App. Div. 2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973), found the use of the plaintiff's name
and biographical data in connection with the defendant's "Howard Hughes Game" to be a com-
mercial appropriation and not "legitimate to the public interest." 72 Misc. 2d at 790, 340
N.Y.S.2d at 146-47.
76. Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc. 2d 831, 836, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 955 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
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its breadth, this privilege has enabled courts to excuse even some com-
mercially motivated infringements on the ground that the overriding
value of free speech "must supersede [the plaintiff's] private pecuniary
considerations. 77 For example, the privilege was applied when a per-
formance was used without consent in a commercially produced and
distributed documentary film that depicted a public event;7" when an
unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes was published for the com-
mercial market;79 and when a mock political campaign poster featuring
a picture of a famous comedian was commercially marketed without
his consent.80
In the Zacchini case it was undisputed that the television station
had used Zacchini's act in the routine dissemination of news.,' Thus,
in order to justify its decision not to apply the traditional newsworthi-
ness privilege in Zacchini, the Court first had to distinguish the right of
publicity in performances from the right of publicity in names, photo-
graphs and personalities. To accomplish this the Court found that a
state has an interest in compensating performers for infringements of
their acts that is not present where it seeks to protect the commercial
value of a name, likeness, or personality. This additional state inter-
est--to encourage the production of entertainment-is, the Court rea-
soned, equivalent to the purpose of the federal copyright statute.
8 2
77. Id. at 837, 337 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
78. Man v. Warner Bros., Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), discussed at note 67 supra.
79. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122
(Sup. Ct. 1968). In Rosemont, the publisher of an unauthorized biography of Howard Hughes
was sued by Hughes' company for misappropriation of its "'sole and exclusive world-wide rights
to exploit commercially ... the name, personality, likeness or the life story or incidents in the life
of Hughes'. ... Id. at 2-3, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 125. The court held that
[t]he publication of a biography is clearly outside the ambit of the "commercial use"
contemplated by the "right of publicity" and such right can have no application to the
publication of factual material which is constitutionally protected. Just as a public
figure's "right of privacy" must yield to the public interest so too must the "right of
publicity" bow where such conflicts with the free dissemination of thoughts, ideas, news-
worthy events, and matters of public interest.
Id. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
80. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
Paulsen was a famous comedian who, for purposes of political satire, had declared himself a
presidential candidate in 1968. Without obtaining Paulsen's consent the defendant produced and
sold a "Paulsen for President" poster which featured a picture of the comedian wearing an "Uncle
Sam" outfit. When Paulsen sued for infringement of his right of publicity the court found the
infringement to be privileged. Although Paulsen claimed that his "political campaign" was only
a publicity stunt, the court reasoned that "[wihen a well-known entertainer enters the presidential
ring, tongue in cheek or otherwise, it is clearly newsworthy and of public interest." Id. at 449,
299 N.Y.S.2d at 507.
81. Justice Powell characterized the broadcast of Zacchini's act as "a routine example of the
press fulfilling the informing function so vital to our system." 433 U.S. at 580 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing).
82. Id. at 576.
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Then, focusing the remainder of its analysis on the state's quasi-copy-
right interest, the Court determined that protecting Zacchini's and
other performers' economic interests would, in the long run, promote
the public's first amendment interest in access to entertainment.83
Conversely, to destroy Zacchini's economic incentive by denying him a
remedy for performance infringement would be detrimental to the pub-
lic interest because it would discourage the production of entertain-
ment. Therefore, the Court concluded, since failure to compensate
Zacchini would negate the state's quasi-copyright interest, there should
be no first amendment immunity for the unauthorized news broadcast
of the performer's entire act.
It may be argued that the Court's analogy between the publicity
right in performances and copyright is appropriate. The inadequacy
of traditional state law remedies for performance infringements was
felt even before the Zacchini case arose.8 4 The need was thought to be
particularly acute for some form of copyright protection that would
protect against the unauthorized fixation and exploitation of a live per-
formance.85 The Zacchini decision clearly recognizes that need.
Moreover, in two recent cases, both cited in Zacchini, the Court held
that states legitimately may legislate copyright and patent protection
for certain forms of creative and intellectual property that remain un-
protected by federal legislation.86 The Court's recognition in Zacchini
that states may provide common law quasi-copyright protection for
performers is consistent with those decisions. Nevertheless, the ques-
tion before the Court in the earlier state cases was whether state legisla-
tion dealing with copyrights and patents was preempted by federal
laws." The question in Zacchini, however, was whether the first
amendment rendered the infringement of a performance privileged be-
83. See id. at 578.
84. See generally Lang, Performance and the Right of the PerformingArtist, 21 ASCAP CoPY-
RIGHT L. SyMP. 69 (1974).
85. See id. 72. The term "fixation" is used here to denote the recording, videotaping or
filming of a live performance.
86. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S.
546 (1973). Goldstein arose before Congress enacted legislation providing statutory copyright
protection for sound recordings. The case involved a challenge to California's "record piracy"
statute that made the unauthorized duplication and commercial sale of records and tapes a crime.
The Court held that "[u]ntil and unless Congress takes further action with respect to recordings-
. . . the California statute may be enforced against acts of [record and tape] piracy .... " 412
U.S. at 571. The Kewanee case upheld the validity of Ohio's trade secret law. The Court stated
in Kewanee that "[t]he only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents and
copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws in this area passed by Congress
.... " 416 U.S. at 479.
87. No first amendment claim was made in either Goldstein or Kewanee.
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cause of its presentation as news. 81 "Disclaiming any attempt to do
more than decide the narrow case before [it]," 9 the Court answered the
question in the negative. An evaluation of the Court's negative an-
swer--the "entire act" rule-requires a brief examination of the con-
cept of "fair use" in copyright law.
2. Fair use: a public interest limitation on absolute copyright
protection. While it relied on a copyright analysis, the Zacchini Court
failed to note that copyright protection is not absolute. Although stat-
utory copyright confers upon copyright owners an exclusive right to
exploit their original works of art or literature,90 certain intrusions into
this right are excused as "fair uses." 91
The fair use doctrine developed as an equitable rule of reason
designed to balance the economic interests of the copyright owner
against the public interest in the wide dissemination of information
needed for the advancement of knowledge.92  Courts and commenta-
tors traditionally have found the rationale for the fair use exception in
the copyright clause of the Constitution.93 The purpose of the statu-
tory protection authorized by the copyright clause is to provide authors
with the economic incentive necessary to ensure that a wide variety of
original and creative ideas will be made available to the public. This
broad range of matter will, in turn, "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."94 If a copyright infringement advances the public
interest in such progress without harming the economic interests of the
copyright owner, the stated purpose of the copyright clause is served.
Thus, under the traditional analysis, such fair infringements must be
permitted to best carry out the policy mandated by the copyright
88. The Court granted certiorari in Zacchini "to consider an issue unresolved by [the] Court:
whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized respondent from damages for its al-
leged infringement of petitioner's state-law 'right of publicity.'" 433 U.S. at 565.
89. Id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90. See 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 102(a), 106 (1976).
91. Id § 107. Numerous commentators have discussed the fair use doctrine. See, e.g.,
Goldstein 1011-14; Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in Copyright Law, 50
NOTRE DAME LAW. 790 (1975); Yankwich, *hat is Fair Use?, 22 CHI. L. REv. 203 (1954); Note,
Copyright Infringement and Fair Use, 40 CIN N. L. REv. 534, 541-46 (1971); Note, Copyright Fair
Use: Case Law and Legislation, 1969 DUKE L.J. 73, 86-109.
92. See, eg., Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
93. U.S. CO NST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); Yank-
wich, supra note 91, at 213-14.
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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clause.95
It is generally agreed that "[a]n arbitrary rule [of fair use] con-
formance to which would be obligatory in all cases, would ill serve the
advance of the arts, ideas, and sciences in which the public has an in-
terest."96  Perhaps for this reason, no definitive test of fair use has
emerged from the cases; rather, courts review a variety of relevant fac-
tors when determining on an ad hoc basis whether a copyright infringe-
ment constituted a fair use.9 7 The version of the fair use doctrine that
has been codified in the new copyright statute suggests the following
nonexclusive list of relevant factors that traditionally have been consid-
ered by copyright courts:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or the
value of the copyrighted work.
9p
The statute expressly provides that, among other fair uses, "the
fair use of a copyrighted work. . . for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, [and] news reporting. . . is not an infringement of copyright."99
In addition, the drafters of the new copyright statute recognized as a
fair use the "incidental and fortuitous reproduction, in a newsreel or
broadcast, of a work located in the scene of an event being re-
ported."'" While copyright courts generally have limited the fair use
exception to copying for such noncommercial public interest pur-
poses, t0 1 in some cases even commercially motivated infringements
95. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
96. Yankwich, supra note 91, at 214.
97. Judge Yankwich states that "whether there has been 'fair use' or not is a pragmatic ques-
tion to be determined by the court, taking into consideration the particular circumstances of each
case." Yankwich, supra note 91, at 205. He cites the following "general criteria" that have been
examined in copyright infringement cases: "'the value of the part appropriated; its relative value
to each of the works in controversy; the purpose it serves in each; how far the copied matter will
tend to supersede the original or interfere with its sale; and other considerations.'" Id. (quoting
Carr v. National Capital Press, Inc., 71 F.2d 220, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934)).
98. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976). The new copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-801
(1976), went into effect on January 1, 1978.
99. 17 U.S.C. app. § 107 (1976).
100. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976) (quoting U.S. REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHT, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (1961)).
101. See, e.g., Chicago Record-Herald Co. v. Tribune Ass'n, 275 F. 797 (7th Cir. 1921); Henry
Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Goldstein 1012-13.
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have been excused as fair uses.10 2
The amount of material infringed is considered both quantita-
tively and qualitatively in a fair use analysis, with the relative weight
given to this and other factors being dependent upon the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. Thus, the copying for commercial purposes
of a relatively small amount of copyrighted material may be actionable
when the infringing use significantly diminishes the value of the origi-
nal work." 3 Conversely, when the copying of an entire work advances
public knowledge without causing economic injury to the copyright
owner the use may be deemed fair."° In general, therefore, an in-
fringement will not be excused when the copying of a protected work
causes economic harm to the copyright owner. 10 5  This general rule is
predicated on the policy of the copyright clause, which is aimed at pro-
moting the public interest by protecting the economic incentive of au-
thors. 10
6
Recently, however, some courts and scholars have suggested that
the fair use privilege is a public interest standard mandated not by the
copyright clause, but by the first amendment. 107 According to this
view, the first amendment protects the public's "right of reasonable ac-
cess to copyrighted material against a monopolistic construction of the
statutory copyright privilege."' 08 This protection is required, it is sug-
gested, to serve the public's first amendment right to be exposed to a
variety of creative, scientific and political expression--exposure that is
deemed a prerequisite to the formation of educated and independent
political judgments. 10 9 To the extent that copyright permits the with-
holding of expression, or the restriction of its dissemination, the pub-
lie's first amendment "right to hear, to read, and to view may. . . be
102. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
103. See, e.g., Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa.
1938). In Holt, a tobacco company used only a few sentences of the plaintiff's scientific work on
the human voice in its cigarette advertising pamphlet. The court found that such a commercial
use of a scientific work significantly diminished its value for the copyright owner. Id. at 304.
104. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl.), a4d, 420 U.S. 376
(1973) (library photocopying).
105. Professor Nimmer states that the decisions dealing with fair use can best be explained by
looking to the central question of whether the defendant's work tends to diminish or prejudice the
potential sale of the plaintiff's work, although this is not always the stated rationale. 3 M. NIMMER
§ 13.05[A][4].
106. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
107. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Goldstein; Rosenfield, supra note 91.
108. Rosenfield, supra note 91, at 794.
109. Goldstein 989.
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sharply curtailed.""' Consequently, these authorities suggest, the con-
stitutional validity of copyright itself is questionable in the absence of a
first amendment fair use privilege to infringe copyrights in the public
interest.
Professor Nimmer, who was perhaps the first to recognize the pres-
ence of a conffict between the first amendment and copyright, "' draws
a distinction between the statutory fair use exception grounded in the
policy of the copyright clause and the first amendment privilege to in-
fringe."12  In most cases where a public interest defense is raised, he
would apply a nonconstitutional fair use analysis to determine whether
the copying of an author's original expression diminished the value of
the original work. Where the infringement of expression was substan-
I10. Id.
111. See Nimmer, Does Copyright 4bridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and
Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1180 (1970). Nimmer states that a "largely ignored paradox" is to be
found in the coexistence of the first amendment, which commands that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press," with the federal copyright statute,
which forbids expression when it takes the form of an unauthorized use of copyrighted material.
Id. 1181. Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered a case challenging the federal
copyright statute on first amendment grounds, Nimmer views such a challenge as inevitable. Id.
1185-86. He believes, however, that copyright ultimately will be held constitutional because it
protects only expression and not ideas themselves. By permitting the free use of ideas, he sug-
gests, copyright does not detract from the free public discussion that the first amendment was
designed to promote. Id. 1189. In a footnote to its opinion in Zacehini the Court indicated its
agreement with Nimmer's analysis. 433 U.S. at 577 n.13.
112. A distinction between the two privileges was made in Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978), where the district court ruled
that the defendant's use of copyrighted material was not excusable under the fair use doctrine, but
excused the use on first amendment grounds. The case involved a television commercial designed
to promote the sale of the defendant's Sunday newspaper which contained a weekly television
magazine supplement. The commercial featured an actor who held up a copy of the plaintiffs TV
Guide magazine while urging viewers to buy the defendant's publication instead. The plaintiff
sought to enjoin further broadcasts of the commercial on the ground that it infringed its exclusive
right, under section 106 of the Copyright Act, to publicly display its copyrighted magazine cover.
After finding that the cover of TV Guide was protected by the plaintiff's copyright in the
magazine, id. at 879, the court ruled that the commercial nature of the defendant's use precluded a
finding of fair use. Turning next to a consideration of the defendant's first amendment claim the
court observed that
[w]hen the Copyright Act and the First Amendment both seek the same objective,
their future coexistence is easily assured. However, when they operate at cross-pur-
poses, the primacy of the First Amendment mandates that the Copyright Act be deprived
of effectuation. Rather than strike down an entire act as overbroad in such a situation,
the judiciary prefers to interpret such a statute as narrowly as needed to preserve it for
the effectuation of those of its purposes deemed consistent with the Constitution.
Id. at 882. Relying on Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977), the court found that the
use of the Copyright Act to enjoin the publication of the comparative commercial advertising at
issue in Triangle would violate the first amendment guarantee of protection for commercial
speech. Id. at 882-83. To avoid a first amendment conflict, the court denied the injunction,
ruling that section 106 of the Copyright Act was not intended to protect copyright owners from
"the disadvantage which arises from the perceived commercial superiority of a [competing] prod-
uct. ... Id. at 883.
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tial enough to harm the author's economic interests Nimmer would
find that the use was not a fair one, in spite of the public interest claim.
This result normally would not conflict with the first amendment, he
explains, because of the idea/expression dichotomy: copyright protects
an author's original expression, but the ideas contained in copyrighted
material may be freely copied by anyone and disseminated to the pub-
lic. 1
13
Nimmer recognizes, however, that with respect to certain copy-
righted matter-usually graphic works-the idea/expression dichot-
omy is conceptually invalid because the author's ideas cannot be
separated from his original expression without some sacrifice of the es-
sential meaning and impact of the work. In cases involving works of
this kind, he would apply a first amendment analysis that balances the
economic interests of the copyright owner against the public's need for
free access to the full meaning of the work. The use of this constitu-
tional balancing test, Nimmer finds, also would most often result in a
finding that the infringement was not privileged; the economic incen-
tive policy of encouraging a broad range of creative and intellectual
productivity usually would outweigh the public's immediate need for
access to the particular work. In a few cases, however, Nimmer would
find a compelling public need for access to the inextricably combined
ideas and expression embodied in a copyrighted work. In these cases
(which he would limit to those involving news photographs) he would
find a copyright infringement excusable on first amendment grounds
even if the economic value of the work to the author was diminished. "
4
II. AN EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S DICHOTOMY
Relying on a copyright analogy in Zacchini, Justice White rea-
soned that the protection of performers' exclusive publicity rights, by
providing the economic incentive to invest time, talent and money in
creating entertainment, would result in an increase in the total quantity
of entertainment made available to the public.1'" At the same time, he
explained, the economic incentive provided by such protection ensures
the broad dissemination of ideas by encouraging "the production of
works of benefit to the public.""' 6 Thus, he found, the question in
Zacchini was not, as in defamation and privacy cases, whether a state
may legitimately inhibit certain publications, but simply "who gets to
do the publishing."' " 7 In view of these considerations, the Court held
113. 1 M. NIMMER § 1.10[D]. The judicially created idea/expression distinction has been
codified in the new copyright statute. 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(b) (1976).
114. 1 M. NIMMER §§ 1.10[C], 1.10[D].
115. 433 U.S. at 576.
116. Id. at 577.
117. Id. at 573.
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that while the press is free to report the "newsworthy facts" about a
performance of interest to the public, "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a per-
former's entire-act without his consent."
' 18
The Court's conception of Zacchini's publicity right as a form of
state copyright protection arguably justifies a distinction drawn be-
tween performance infringement, on the one hand, and both the defa-
mation/privacy torts and the traditional right of publicity on the
other."' As Justice White's opinion implies, state law protection of
individuals' reputations and sensibilities has the immediate effect of in-
hibiting the publication of speech without producing any compensatory
public benefit over the long term.' 20 Consequently, the media must
continue to enjoy a significant measure of immunity from liability for
defamation and privacy damages to ensure the free dissemination of
news. A similar conflict with the public interest may inhere in the
traditional right of publicity, since state law protection of the commer-
cial value of a celebrity's name, likeness or personality serves primarily
to enhance individual property rights. Because this protection also in-
hibits expression without serving at the same time to promote long-
term first amendment concerns, a similarly broad public interest privi-
lege arguably is required in such cases. 2 ' The Court's double stan-
dard of protection for media infringements' 22 therefore would be
difficult to justify if it were predicated solely upon a distinction between
the individual economic interest protected by the right of publicity and
the individual interests served by state defamation and privacy law.
However, in the case of performance infringements a lesser standard of
media protection can be justified on another ground.
118. Id. at 575.
119. In addition to the "economic incentive" distinction, see text accompanying note 82 supra,
the Court distinguished Zacchini on another ground:
[Iln this case, Ohio has recognized what may be the strongest case for a "right of public-
ity"--involving not the appropriation of an entertainer's reputation to enhance the at-
tractiveness of a commercial product, but the appropriation of the very activity by which
the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place.
433 U.S. at 576.
120. See id. at 573.
121. The protection ofa celebrity's economic incentive to exploit his name or likeness arguably
serves only individual commercial interests and not a societal value. No first amendment benefit
is achieved when a state encourages celebrities to lend their names and faces to the promotion of
commercial products. However, the remedy provided by the traditional right of publicity occa-
sionally may promote first amendment values. For example, in those cases where a name or
likeness has been misappropriated to advertise or endorse a commercial product, the remedy pro-
vided by the right of publicity may guard against the dissemination of false and misleading adver-
tising. In such cases, however, the public interest privilege is inapplicable. See note 73 supra and
accompanying text.
122. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
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The right of publicity in performances is analytically distinct from
the traditional right of publicity in names, likenesses and personalities.
As the Zacchini Court suggested, economic protection for performers
will, in the long run, increase the amount of entertainment available for
public consumption. Consequently, the exclusive right of publicity in
performances normally promotes the public's first amendment inter-
ests. No equivalent first amendment purpose is achieved, however,
when a state provides celebrities with an economic incentive to com-
mercially exploit their names, likenesses and personalities. Therefore,
it is the public interest-promoting "copyright" purpose underlying the
performer's exclusive publicity right z3 that alone justifies a lesser stan-
dard of media protection when a performance is infringed. Neverthe-
less, while a broad media privilege to infringe newsworthy
performances may not be required by the first amendment, the Court's
"entire act" standard fails to recognize the inherent conflict between
the right of publicity in performances and the first amendment.
124
This conflict is revealed through an extension of the Court's own copy-
right analogy.
Despite disagreement among courts and scholars concerning the
extent to which the first amendment limits copyright, all agree that at
some point copyright comes into conflict with the first amendment.
25
123. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
124. Given the unique circumstances of the Zacchini case, the Court's denial of a news privi-
lege in that case seemsjustified. See text accompanying notes 151-55 infra. The "entire act" test,
however, seems to have resulted from the Court's undue reliance on the fact that Zacchini's in-
come was derived solely from his human cannonball act. Indeed, the Court expressly noted that
by enabling viewers to see a free performance of the entire act the broadcaster's infringement went
"to the heart of [Zacchini's] ability to earn a living as an entertainer." 433 U.S. at 576. When
other individual interests are infringed, however, harm to the individual's ability to earn a living is
not relevant to the question whether the infringement was privileged. In copyright law, for exam-
ple, whether or not the infringed work is the sole source of the author's livelihood is irrelevant to
fair use inquiry. See text accompanying notes 97-106 supra. Similarly, some celebrities' incomes
are derived solely from commercial exploitation of their names or faces. The face of a famous
photographic model, for example, might lose commercial value if it received excessive media ex-
posure. Although a diminution of the value of the model's face also would go "to the heart of
[his] ability to earn a living," all news uses of his photograph are nonetheless privileged. See text
accompanying note 70 supra. Moreover, the reputational harm that the common law of defama-
tion sought to redress was, at least in part, an economic interest that in many cases "went to the
heart of[a plaintiffs] ability to earn a living." See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs § 112, at 757
(4th ed. 1971). Nonetheless, the Court has firmly established that a state's legitimate interest in
protecting its public figure citizens from reputational harm, including such harm that adversely
affects their earning ability, is insufficient to overcome the media defense of first amendment privi-
lege absent proof of knowing or reckless falsity. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
125. See generally Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspa-
pers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875 (S.D. Fla. 1978); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Goldstein; Nimmer, supra note Il1; Patterson, Private Copyright and Public
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Through judicial application of the idea/expression distinction, how-
ever, the copyright owner's economic interests may in most cases be
fully protected without significant harm to the public's right of access to
information.'26 But this is not because public access to an author's
expression as well as to his ideas is not required by the first amend-
ment; rather, the idea/expression dichotomy is merely a temporary
compromise designed to accommodate both the individual and the so-
cietal interests at stake in a copyright infringement case.127 The lim-
ited duration of statutory copyright protection'28 is itself evidence of
this compromise. The durational limit reflects the principle that once
there is no longer an economic incentive present to justify a monopoly
on expression, the first amendment requires that an author's expression
as well as his ideas be made freely available to the public.' 29 More-
over, even during the term of a copyright a compelling need for imme-
diate public access to copyrighted expression can outweigh the long-
term public benefit that is expected to result from copyright protection.
In such cases, courts have excused infringements of expression on pub-
lic interest grounds regardless of the amount of copyrighted material
infringed.'
30
Like a copyrightable fixed work, a live performance embodies
both an idea and its expression. Thus, it can readily be conceptualized
as a "work" capable of protection by the exclusive quasi-copyright 13 '
recognized by the Zacchini Court. As in copyright, the underlying
idea of such a protected work may be freely used by others. Therefore,
the Court found, the television station was free to verbally describe
Zacchini's act and to "stage . . . or film . . . its own 'human can-
nonball' act,"'132 even if to do so would require copying the idea of the
act from Zacchini. With respect to certain works of this kind, how-
ever, the first amendment will require unrestricted access to more than
Communication: Free Speech Endangered, 28 VAND. L. REv. 1161 (1975); Rosenfield, supra note
91.
126. See, e.g., Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 345 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
127. See Nimmer, supra note 111, at 1192.
128. See 17 U.S.C. app. § 302(a) (1976): "IN GENERAL.-Copyright in a work created on or
after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and ... endures for a term consisting of the life of
the author and fifty years after the author's death."
129. Nimmer, supra note 111, at 1193-95. Nimmer suggested that the perpetual duration
of common law copyright may have violated the first amendment because the economic incentive
purpose disappears after the combined lifetimes of the author and his immediate descendants.
Id. 1193.
130. Eg., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See I M.
NIMMER § 1.10[D].
131. A live performance cannot be the subject of statutory copyright because it is not a work
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression .... 17 U.S.C. app. § 102(a) (1976).
132. 433 U.S. at 578 n.13.
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just the performer's "raw ideas."' 33
In some circumstances, certain information may be embodied only
in a particular live performance and may meaningfully be conveyed
only by the expression of that particular work itself. In such cases, the
fixation and publication of a particular performance conveys informa-
tion that is unavailable in any prior or subsequent live or filmed per-
formance. Since there is no alternative means of access to the
expression of such a work, a failure to allow dissemination of the work
itself effectively prevents the dissemination of information. If the
unique information contained in the work is relevant to the public in-
terest, the public's immediate first amendment right of access to the
work may outweigh the long-term need for new entertainment which is
the public need served by the exclusive right of publicity in perform-
ances. Therefore, when an infringement of such a "newsworthy" per-
formance is required to best serve the public interest, the media must
enjoy a privilege to infringe.
Although a news privilege clearly is required in some cases, the
Court's refusal to extend the Hill newsworthiness rationale 34 to the
facts of Zacehini may nonetheless have been justified. As the Court
recognized, a standard that would privilege the media to infringe any
"performance of interest to the public"'' 35 eventually might harm the
public interest by inhibiting the production of new entertainment while
doing little to serve immediate first amendment values. Nevertheless,
the Court's quantitative entire act standard is overinclusive because it
precludes media immunity even in those cases where the public interest
may be better served by the infringement of an entire performance.
Moreover, in cases where a legitimate public interest defense is absent,
a performer may still be denied a remedy for infringement of his act
simply because he fails to meet the quantitative criterion of the
Zacchini test. 36 Therefore, because it fails adequately to accommo-
date either the first amendment or the quasi-copyright issues that may
be presented in future performance infringement cases, the Zacchini
entire-act standard is an inadequate legal test. In contrast, a qualita-
133. 1 M. NIMMER § 1.10[D].
134. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
135. 433 U.S. at 576.
136. A slight modification of the actual facts in Zacchini demonstrates the underinclusiveness
of the entire-act test. Had the television station shown only fourteen rather than fifteen seconds
of Zacchini's performance the damage to the value of his act, if any, undoubtedly would have
been the same. Nevertheless, the negative implication of the Court's holding is that the news
infringement of less than an entire act is privileged by the first amendment. Under a traditional
copyright analysis, however, the infringement of fourteen seconds of a fifteen second "work" nor-
mally would be deemed actionable, absent a finding of fair use. See text accompanying note 103
supra.
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tive "fair use" test for performance infringements would provide a
more pragmatic and analytically consistent method of accommodating
both of these interests. The next section will attempt to define the ap-
propriate scope of a media privilege to infringe newsworthy perform-
ances and will propose a qualitative analysis that incorporates the
privilege.
III. A NEWSWORTHINESS STANDARD FOR PERFORMANCE
INFRINGEMENT CASES
A. The First Amendment Rationale for a Public Interest Exception.
It is the position of this Note that the first amendment conflicts
with the right of publicity in performances to a greater extent than it
conflicts with copyright. 137 Notwithstanding the Zacchini Court's ap-
parent reliance on the notion that the idea and expression of Zacchini's
act were independent and separable components,1 38 it may be argued
that the idea/expression dichotomy is conceptually invalid when the
work in question is a performance. As Professor Nimmer has observed,
the first amendment justification for the idea/expression dichotomy in
copyright "is not that ideas are useful without expression, but rather
that while public enlightenment may require the copying of ideas from
others, it remains perfectly possible for the speaker (or writer) who cop-
ies ideas from another, to supply his own expression of such ideas."
1 39
Thus, the economic incentive purpose of copyright outweighs the first
amendment interests that are served by the copying of expression when
an infringer could have substituted his own expression for that of the
copyright owner. However, "in those special instances where the ex-
pression for a given idea may not be independently supplied by an idea
copier,""'4 the idea/expression dichotomy is no longer viable and a first
amendment analysis must be applied.
The idea of an entertainer's act can rarely, if ever, be conveyed
effectively by substituting expression in the form of a verbal description
137. The negative implications of both the Zacchini Court's reasoning and its entire-act rule
suggest that the Court agrees with this proposition. For example, the Court was careful to note
that Zacchini had not attempted to prevent dissemination of his act by seeking an injunction. 433
U.S. at 573. The Court's observation suggests that injunctive relief would be impermissible in a
performance infringement case on first amendment grounds. However, a copyright infringement
may be enjoined, 17 U.S.C. app. § 502 (1976), without violating the first amendment. But see
Goldstein 988.
In addition, the Court's provision of a purely quantitative entire-act test for performance
infringement represents another departure from its copyright analogy. This departure suggests
that the first amendment permits broader protection for copyrighted works than for performances.
138. See 433 U.S. at 573-74, 578 n.13.




or an imitation for the performer's own expression. 41  Therefore, since
a performance cannot be separated into idea and expression compo-
nents without a significant diminution of its meaning and impact, the
idea/expression dichotomy cannot be applied in a principled manner
to mitigate the conflict between the first amendment and a performer's
exclusive publicity right. Since the idea/expression compromise is un-
available in this context, any protection of the exclusive publicity right
in performances will necessarily conflict to some extent with the first
amendment. Consequently, the question in a performance infringe-
ment case is not, as it is in copyright, whether both an infringement and
a first amendment conflict could have been avoided by the use of the
copier's own expression to convey another's ideas. Rather, the ques-
tion is to what extent may an unavoidable first amendment conflict be
tolerated in order to protect a performer's intellectual property interests
from infringements. This question can be answered only through the
case-by-case application of a first amendment analysis that balances
the public benefit, if any, achieved by the infringing use of an act
against the public benefit that may accrue from protecting a per-
former's economic incentive.
Such a qualitative first amendment analysis of performance in-
fringements will necessarily bear some resemblance to the copyright
fair use doctrine. Both analyses focus on the nature and circumstances
of an unauthorized use of protected expression 142 in order to determine
whether the use should be excused or characterized as an actionable
infringement. However, the performance infringement analysis must
give greater deference to the first amendment since there is no affirma-
tive grant of state authority equivalent to the policy expressed in the
copyright clause 143 that justifies the granting of an exclusive common
law right m performances. Moreover, as was discussed above, exclu-
sive protection for performers inherently conflicts with the first amend-
ment to a greater extent than does copyright. Therefore, it may well be
argued that the media privilege to infringe newsworthy performances
should be broader than the copyright fair use exception, which gener-
ally is inapplicable where the copyright owner suffers economic
141. It has been said that "a work of art cannot be described; it can only be experienced."
This is obviously true, as anyone who attempts to describe the "idea" of the Mona Lisa
or of Michelangelo's Moses must realize. To the extent that a meaningful democratic
dialogue depends upon access to graphic works generally.., it must be said that little is
contributed by the idea divorced from its expression.
Id. § l.lo[CI[2].
142. The fair use doctrine is applied only where there has been copying of protected expres-
sion. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
143. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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harm.144
On the other hand, the fact that a state's protection of performers'
rights in their acts normally serves to promote first amendment con-
cerns suggests that the newsworthiness privilege in performance in-
fringement cases should be somewhat narrower than that enjoyed
under New York Times and Hill. In order to narrow the privilege,
however, the first amendment analysis must employ a "normative"
rather than a "descriptive" definition of newsworthiness. 145  Rather
than granting the media a blanket privilege to make any "routine
news" use 146 of a performance, courts instead must determine whether
the importance of the public interest in access to information required a
particular performance infringement. This analysis would, of course,
require courts to make value judgments which the Gertz Court thought
were more appropriately made by editors than by judges.147  Neverthe-
less, as the Firestone decision illustrates, such normative decision mak-
ing frequently is an unavoidable judicial task.14  Moreover, it is a task
that courts have undertaken successfully in copyright infringement
cases. 149
B. A Proposed Qualitative Analysis.
A qualitative first amendment analysis of a performance infringe-
ment must balance the public interest served by the unauthorized
broadcast of a protected work against the economic interests of the per-
former. In those cases where the long-term first amendment interest
promoted by the economic incentive rationale is less weighty than the
public's immediate need for access, the infringement should be excused
regardless of the amount of material infringed. Where the economic
144. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
145. Shortly after the Hill case was decided, Professor Kalven observed that
[n]ewsworthiness will almost certainly become a descriptive and not a normative term.
In brief, the press will be the arbiters of it and the Court will be forced to yield to the
argument that whatever the press prints is by virtue of that fact newsworthy. . . . The
upshot. . . is that the logic of New York Times and Hill taken together grants the press
some measure of constitutional protection for anything the press thinks is a matter of
public interest.
Kalven, supra note 28, at 284.
146. Justice Powell argued that Zacchini could not, "consistently with the First Amendment,
complain of routine news reportage" after he chose to perform a newsworthy public act. 433 U.S.
at 582 (Powell, J., dissenting).
147. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
148. See note 45 supra.
149. See, e.g., Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)
(copying by biographer of another's work containing information about the life of Howard
Hughes excused on public interest grounds); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130




incentive purpose is weightier, however, the infringement should be
found actionable even where less than an entire-act has been infringed.
The question of public access to information is central to this first
amendment inquiry. 150 Like the television station's infringement of
Zacchini's act, some performance infringements-although clearly
"newsworthy" in a descriptive sense' 51-will do no more than provide
the public with free access to entertainment it would otherwise have to
pay for. All information that is contained in, and must be conveyed
by, the performance itself can be obtained from any other performance
of the same act.' 52  Thus, the public can be adequately informed by
paying to see another, equally informative, performance. The existence
of an alternative means of access to the act does not mean, however,
that legal protection of a performer's economic interests in these cir-
cumstances does not conflict with the first amendment. On the con-
trary, prohibiting publication of the act by anyone but the performer
clearly prevents the dissemination of entertainment (and the ideas it
conveys) to the widest possible audience. This clash with the first
amendment can be justified only if, on balance, the public interest will
be better served by protecting the performer's economic incentive. It is
at this point, then, that a court must make a normative evaluation of
the newsworthiness of the infringed performance.
If it is found that dissemination of the information embodied in
the performance can be suppressed to the extent necessary to protect
the performer's economic incentive without adversely affecting free ex-
change in the "marketplace of ideas"'53 then the infringement should
be deemed actionable. This finding would not require a judgment that
pure entertainment does not "contribute . . . to the democratic dia-
logue."154 The finding of "non-newsworthiness" would rest instead on
a determination that the immediate contribution made by the informa-
tion embodied in the work is outweighed by the long-term societal need
150. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the first amendment protects both the right
to speak and the right of access to speech. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see, e.g., Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969):
[It] is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas. . . rather than to countenance monopolization of that market. . . . It is the
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other
ideas and experiences which is crucial here.
151. See note 145 supra.
152. Although information may be provided by the broadcaster along with free access to the
protected work, the infringement of the work itself is not required to convey the information. For
example, the news commentator could have informed the public that Zacchini was currently ap-
pearing at a local county fair without showing the film of Zacehini's act.
153. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
154. 1 M. NIMMER § 1.I0[C][2]. On the contrary, art (including entertainment) frequently is a
very accurate barometer of social and political change.
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for exposure to various forms of creative activity.1 55  Even in these
cases, however, the balance in favor of the long-term first amendment
interest depends upon the presence of the economic incentive rationale.
Consequently, where the infringement of a "non-newsworthy" per-
formance has caused no actual economic harm156 to the performer, no
first amendment interest is served by holding the broadcaster-infringer
liable for damages. Conversely, where actual economic harm has re-
sulted from a "non-newsworthy" infringement, the economic incentive
rationale is equally weighty whether an entire act or less than an en-
tire act has been infringed.'57
While the use of a qualitative analysis would provide a remedy for
some media infringements of "non-newsworthy" performances, the
same analysis also would permit a finding of media immunity where an
infringement of an act has occurred to serve the public interest. 58  The
entire-act standard, however, would prohibit the unauthorized use of
an act, even if an infringement were required to report news involving
a matter of significant public concern. This problem is illustrated by
the following hypothetical case.
Suppose, for example, that a riot breaks out in the audience mo-
ments before the start of one of Zacchini's performances. A television
reporter is present and films the event. Because the reporter is seated
opposite the rioters the film captures Zacchini's entire fifteen-second
ffight. A local television station later broadcasts the film on the eve-
ning news, enabling millions of television viewers to see the entire
human cannonball act. Zacchini sues in state court for infringement of
his right of publicity. If the state court were to apply the entire-act test
to these facts it would be compelled to find the television station liable
for any damage to the value of Zacchini's act, simply because his en-
155. See id.:
Admittedly, the democratic dialogue gains little from free access to graphic work "ideas"
divorced from expression. But even were the speech value of free access to graphic work
"expressions" to be weighed against the copyright value in encouraging the creation of
such graphic works, the copyright interest would appear to prevail in most cases....
This is not to say that the visual impact of graphic works is totally without significance,
but only that its weight, on balance, does not seem to equal the copyright interest that
encourages the creation of graphic works.
156. Actual economic harm would include such elements as a reduction in box-office receipts,
a reduction in bookings and the cancellation of contracts for future engagements. Compare the
allowance of statutory damages for copyright infringement where actual damages cannot be
proved. 17 U.S.C. app. § 504(c) (1976).
157. See note 136 supra.
158. Cf. Goldstein 988 (suggesting that the first amendment "requires that copyright infringe-
ment be excused if the subject matter of the infringed material is relevant to the public interest
and the appropriator's use of the material independently advances the public interest").
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tire-act was broadcast without consent.' 59 Under the qualitative anal-
ysis proposed here, however, the court would first evaluate the nature
of the information conveyed by the infringement. If it determined that
news of a riot is the kind of information that is essential to the "market-
place of ideas," the court next would ask whether a noninfringing news
broadcast adequately could have conveyed news of the riot to the pub-
lic. Since the only alternative available to the broadcaster would have
been to give a verbal report of the riot, perhaps accompanied by still
pictures, there is arguably no adequate substitute for the infringing
news film.'6 ' In the hypothetical case, therefore, the infringement
would be excused-regardless of any economic injury to
Zacchini-because the public's immediate need for complete informa-
tion about a newsworthy event would outweigh its long-term need for
entertainment.
In the hypothetical riot case, the infringing work-the news
film-makes only an "incidental" use 16 1 of the infringed
work-Zacchini's act. The act itself conveys no newsworthy informa-
tion; it merely is involved in a newsworthy event. In certain circum-
stances, however, the infringed work itself will be newsworthy. For
example, if at the time of the filming of his act Zacchini had been in-
jured when he landed in the net, that particular performance would
have conveyed unique information that could not have been conveyed
by any subsequent performance of his act. Under the proposed analy-
sis, the television station would have been entitled by the first amend-
ment to broadcast that entire act 162 on the same grounds that justify the
privilege in the riot case. As in the riot case, the only alternative avail-
able to the broadcaster would have been a verbal description of the
accident. Again, resort to this alternative means of reporting a public
event would have inadequately served the public's right of access to
information. Since the long-term availability of entertainment would
not have compensated for the suppression of information in this case, a
court would have been justified in defining the performance as news-
worthy.
159. See text accompanying note 118 supra. In a copyright infringement case an incidental
news use would qualify as a fair use. See text accompanying note 100 spra.
160. See 433 U.S. at 580-81 (Powell, J., dissenting).
161. See note 159 supra.
162. It might be argued that this hypothetical case does not involve Zacchini's "entire" act on
the ground that his usual entire act includes a safe landing. This possible distinction provides
support for Justice Powell's observation that "in future cases involving different performances,
. . . difficulties in determining just what constitutes the 'entire act' are inevitable." 433 U.S. at
579 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As the common law right of publicity continues to evolve, the bur-
den will be on the states to ensure that their protection of performers'
economic interests does not erode vital first amendment values. 163 At
the same time, however, the states should provide sufficient quasi-copy-
right protection to discourage performance infringements by the media
when they do not serve to advance the public's first amendment inter-
ests. To best achieve this dual objective state courts require a flexible,
qualitative standard that can be applied to a variety of performance
infringement cases where the public interest is asserted as a defense.
The utility of the entire-act standard is clearly limited to the
unique facts of the Zacchini case. As this Note has demonstrated, the
mechanical application of the quantitative Zacchini standard in other
cases may fail to deal adequately with either the quasi-copyright or the
first amendment interests at stake. The application of a first amend-
ment "fair use" test for news infringements of performances would,
however, permit courts to evaluate both the intellectual property and
the free speech aspects of each case.
The underlying newsworthiness concept of the New York Times
and Hill line of precedent remains valid and applicable to the develop-
ing state law of intellectual property. While clarification of the con-
cept arguably is necessary-one commentator has observed that
although "the Court in Hill equated 'public interest' with 'newsworthi-
ness,' it is only the former term which should endure for purposes of
constitutional definition''a-4 its essential usefulness is unchanged.
Thus courts, relying on the underlying principle, may continue to privi-
lege a much broader range of speech than that which concerns issues of
"governing importance,"'' 65 without being "forced to yield to the argu-
ment that whatever the press prints [or a television station broadcasts]
is by virtue of that fact newsworthy."'
166
The necessary task of defining newsworthiness in a normative
rather than a descriptive sense admittedly is a formidable one for
courts to undertake. Nevertheless, as Justice Brennan observed in
Gertz, the making of such normative judgments traditionally has been
a function of courts in their role as "ultimate arbiters" of constitutional
disputes. 67 Justice Holmes long ago cautioned courts against avoiding
163. The Court stated that "the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the
press in the circumstances of this case.. 433 U.S. at 578-79.
164. Goldstein 994.
165. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
166. See note 145 supra.
167. 418 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the task of "weighing considerations of social advantage." "The duty
is inevitable," he explained, "and the result of the often proclaimed
judicial aversion to deal with such considerations is simply to leave the
very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate, and often un-
conscious .... 168
Phyllis Glass
168. Holmes, The Path oftke Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 467 (1897).
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